Illinois\u27 Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act: An Indirect Step in the Right Direction—A Survey of Housing Appeals Statutes by Devitt, Jennifer
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 18 Whiteness: Some Critical Perspectives 
January 2005 
Illinois' Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act: An Indirect 
Step in the Right Direction—A Survey of Housing Appeals Statutes 
Jennifer Devitt 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jennifer Devitt, Illinois' Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act: An Indirect Step in the Right 
Direction—A Survey of Housing Appeals Statutes, 18 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 267 (2005), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
267 
Illinois’ Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal 
Act: An Indirect Step in the Right Direction—A 
Survey of Housing Appeals Statutes 
Jennifer Devitt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States faces an affordable-housing crisis.1 The crisis 
means that for the fourteen million households below the poverty 
line, nearly two thirds of their monthly income is spent on housing.2 
The crisis impacts more than just the poor—fifty-two percent of 
American households have difficulty meeting their monthly housing 
expenses,3 and it is exacerbated by a severe shortage of safe, sanitary, 
low- and moderate-income housing.4 This shortage does not result 
from an unwillingness to construct such housing, however. Instead, 
municipalities, especially suburban municipalities, motivated by 
racism and classism, create insurmountable legal barriers to the 
construction of affordable housing,5 disguising their motives as a 
desire to preserve municipal resources and the environment.6 These 
barriers delay the construction of, and increase development costs 
 
 * J.D. (2005), Washington University School of Law. This author would like to thank 
Howard A. Stamper Professor of Law Daniel R. Mandelker for his help, comments and support. 
 1. Paul K. Casey, Coming of Age, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. 1, 
2 (2003); see also Kenneth Forton, Note, Expanding the Effectiveness of the Massachusetts 
Comprehensive Permit Law by Eliminating Its Subsidy Requirement, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 651, 653–56 (2001) (discussing the current affordable housing crisis). 
 2. Casey, supra note 1, at 2. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Infra text accompanying notes 16, 41, 62. 
 5. Forton, supra note 1, at 652. 
 6. See id.; Melinda Westbrook, Connecticut’s New Affordable Housing Appeals 
Procedure: Assaulting the Presumptive Validity of Land Use Decisions, 66 CONN. B.J. 169, 
173–75 (1992). 
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for, affordable housing, making such housing much more difficult to 
construct.7 
Many states have attempted to counteract this “overregulation.” 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut employ an affordable 
housing appeals procedure.8 The appeals procedure gives an 
affordable housing developer whose housing application is denied 
access to a special appeals process. The process reverses the 
traditional presumption that a municipality’s land use decision is 
valid and instead requires a municipality to justify its decision.9 
These appeals procedures have had at least some success in building 
affordable housing in their respective states.10 Despite this, they have 
been the subject of much criticism, some justified.11 
Recently, Illinois implemented its own affordable housing appeals 
procedure (the “Illinois Act” or the “Act”).12 Like the other appeals 
procedures, the Illinois Act provides a builder’s remedy for 
developers that wish to construct affordable housing.13 However, the 
Act contains significant differences from its East Coast counterparts. 
This note examines the Illinois Act in light of the other appeals 
procedures in order to determine whether it will suffer from the same 
faults and criticisms.  
Part II of this note briefly describes the configurations of the 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut appeals procedures 
and their effects on the affordable housing supply. Part III discusses 
criticism and praise of the appeals procedures. Part IV explores the 
configuration of the Illinois Act, predicts the reception it will receive 
 7. Forton, supra note 1, at 654. 
 8. See infra notes 15–29, 39–53, 61–78 and accompanying text. 
 9. Westbrook, supra note 6, at 172. Traditionally, land use officials are given 
tremendous deference to deny or approve housing applications; “unless [a] challenger can 
demonstrate that the local board [is] motivated by some improper purpose, or that its action [is] 
arbitrary or capricious or procedurally defective, the challenge . . . fail[s].” Id. at 177. Courts go 
“to great lengths to give planning and zoning board decisions ‘every presumption of validity.’” 
Id. Because a court’s review is limited to the record, local land use authorities further insulate 
their decisions by including very little of their rationale in the record of decision. See id. at 180 
(discussing case in which local board denied affordable housing application without giving 
reasons for denial in order to avoid review). 
 10. Infra notes 30–38, 54–60, 79–84 and accompanying text. 
 11. Infra notes 85–108 and accompanying text.  
 12. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/1–50 (Supp. 2003). 
 13. Id. at 67/30. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/12
p267 Devitt book pages.doc  10/18/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005]  A Survey of Housing Appeals Statutes 269 
 
 
 
based on evaluations of the other appeals procedures, and concludes 
that while the Illinois Act is a valuable tool for the construction of 
affordable housing, the Act’s deviations from the other appeals 
procedures will do very little to temper problems with its own 
appeals process.14  
II. OVERVIEW OF STATE APPEALS LAWS 
A. Massachusetts’ Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act 
Enacted in 1969, the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and 
Zoning Appeals Act15 (“Chapter 40B”) was the first state statute to 
create a builder’s remedy. It resulted from Massachusetts’ 
recognition that there existed an “acute shortage of decent, safe and 
low and moderate cost housing.”16 Its purpose was to “stimulate the 
production of affordable housing in conjunction with a state or 
federal subsidy program.”17 
Chapter 40B consists of a comprehensive permit component and 
an appeals component. The comprehensive permit component allows 
a public agency, limited dividend organization, or nonprofit 
organization18 that wishes to build low- or moderate-income housing 
 14. This note only gives a general overview of each state’s appeals procedure and the 
issues that appeals procedures raise. However, many of the sources cited in this note provide a 
much more detailed analysis of specific states’ appeals procedures and their issues. 
 15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, §§ 20–23 (2002). 
 16. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 30.01(2) (2002). 
 17. MASS. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., GUIDELINES FOR HOUSING PROGRAMS IN 
WHICH FUNDING IS PROVIDED THROUGH A NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY 2 (2003). Some 
argue that the requirement that affordable housing be tied to a subsidy program is misplaced. 
See, e.g., Sam Stonefield, Affordable Housing in Suburbia: The Importance but Limited Power 
and Effectiveness of the State Override Tool, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 337 (2001) 
(arguing that the correct focus should be “on the affordability of the units, without regard to 
[how] the builder achieves that affordability”).  
 Chapter 40B also aims to “provide a way for a municipality to have town boards and 
committees work cooperatively and simultaneously with the local ZBA to structure a project 
with at least 25% affordable units.” Mass. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., Chapter 40B 
Discussion Forum 4 (2001). Finally, Chapter 40B seeks to ensure that at least ten percent of the 
housing stock within all Massachusetts’ municipalities is affordable. Terry J. Tondro, 
Connecticut’s Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: After Ten Years of Hope, Why Only 
Middling Results?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 115, 121 (2001). 
 18. Sam Stonefield, Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law, 
notes that “[g]iven sufficient flexibility in the interpretation of the phrase ‘limited dividend 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to submit a single building application to the local zoning board of 
appeals (ZBA) in lieu of the several applications to different boards 
that are normally necessary.19 Chapter 40B directs the ZBA to notify 
the other boards about the application, to hold a public hearing on the 
application, and to grant or deny the application within forty days of 
the public hearing.20 If the ZBA grants the application, a 
comprehensive permit (CP) is issued.21 If the ZBA denies the 
application or grants it with conditions that make the project 
“uneconomic,”22 the applicant may trigger the appeals component by 
filing an appeal with the Housing Appeals Committee (HAC).23  
Chapter 40B requires the HAC to hold proceedings on the appeal 
within twenty days after the appeal is filed and to render a decision 
on the appeal within thirty days after termination of the 
organization’ and skill in drafting and planning, the [restrictions on who qualifies to apply for a 
CP] need not be a major barrier to participation in the affordable housing process.” Stonefield, 
supra note 17, at 336. Stonefield further notes that the restrictions still exclude smaller, private, 
single family homebuilders. Id. However, with the advent of the Massachusetts Local Initiative 
Program (LIP) which permits developers without a government subsidy to use the CP process if 
at least twenty-five percent of the units they propose are affordable and they receive approval of 
the chief elected official of the municipality, fully alleviates the exclusion of private developers 
from the affordable housing playing field. Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The Impact and Evolution 
of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: Thirty Years of 
Experience with a State Legislative Effort to Overcome Exclusionary Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 381, 390 n.49 (2001). For a thorough discussion of LIPs, see Forton, supra note 1, at 
668–72. 
 19. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 21. This streamlined process helps to alleviate some of 
the problems with “overregulation.” The project must be eligible for a subsidy under a 
subsidizing agency to assist in the production of low or moderate income housing and the 
applicant must obtain a project eligibility letter to that effect in order to gain admission to the 
ZBA. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.01(2). See Jonathon Douglas Witten, The Cost of 
Developing Affordable Housing: At What Price?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509, 537–39 
(2003), for an argument that the letter requirement “is a charade.” 
 20. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 21. The time limit can be “extended by mutual 
agreement between the board and the applicant.” Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. “Uneconomic” is defined as “any condition . . . that . . . makes it impossible for [the 
applicant] . . . to proceed in building or operating low or moderate income housing without 
financial loss, or for a limited dividend organization to proceed and still realize a reasonable 
return.” Id. § 20. 
 23. Id. § 22. The HAC is a five member board. Three members are appointed by the 
Director of the Department of Housing and Community Development and two are appointed by 
the Governor. MASS. HOUS. APPEALS COMM., HOUSING APPEALS COMMITTEE FACT SHEET 1 
(2003). 
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proceedings.24 During the proceedings, the HAC is limited to 
determining whether, from the ZBA’s record, the ZBA’s decision is 
“reasonable and consistent with local needs.”25 In the case of an 
approval with uneconomic conditions, the HAC must also determine 
whether the conditions actually make the project uneconomic.26 To 
survive the HAC’s review, the ZBA must show either that its 
decision is consistent with local needs27 or “that there is a valid 
health, safety, environmental, design, open space, or other local 
concern . . . that . . . outweighs the regional housing need.”28 If the 
ZBA is unable to meet this burden of proof, it must issue a CP and 
modify or remove any uneconomic conditions it imposed on the 
project.29 
Chapter 40B has substantially impacted Massachusetts’ affordable 
housing supply. Nearly thirty thousand new housing units exist as a 
direct result of it, and an additional 3600 units are under 
construction.30 Approximately two-thirds of these units are 
 
 24. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 22. The time limit can be extended by mutual 
agreement between the HAC and applicant. Id. 
 25. Id. § 23. 
 26. Id.  
 27. A ZBA denial is consistent with local needs when: 
(1) at least 10% of its [municipality’s] total housing stock consists of subsidized 
housing for low- and moderate-income households; (2) at least 1.5% of its 
[municipality’s] land zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use is used for 
such housing; or (3) a proposed development would result within one calendar year in 
the start of construction of low- and moderate-income housing on more than 0.3% of 
the [municipality’s] land zoned for residential, commercial, or industrial use, or ten 
acres, whichever is larger.  
Krefetz, supra note 18, at 388. For purposes of calculating whether a locality meets any of the 
exemptions, see MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.04 (2002). Other evidence that a ZBA’s 
decision is consistent with local needs includes: (1) Recent progress made toward the ten 
percent minimum, id. § 31.07(1)(d); (2) the housing proposal is proportionally large compared 
to the locality’s total housing units, id. § 31.07(1)(g); another application was filed by the 
developer no more that twelve months prior to the current application that contained no low or 
moderate income housing, id. § 31.07(1)(h); or the locality adopts an affordable housing plan, 
id. § 31.07(1)(i). These provisions “give an incentive to communities to take the initiative to 
develop a ‘reasonable’ amount of subsidized housing.” Krefetz, supra note 18, at 388. 
 28. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 760, § 31.06(5)–(8). 
 29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B, § 23. “[V]ictory is almost certain” for an applicant on 
appeal. Witten, supra note 19, at 539–40; see also Krefetz, supra note 18, at 397–98 (stating 
that from 1969 to 2001 eighty-four percent of ZBA decisions were overruled). 
 30. CITIZENS’ HOUS. & PLANNING ASSOC., THE RECORD ON 40B: THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS AFFORDABLE HOUSING ZONING LAW 8 (2003) [hereinafter CHAPA 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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affordable.31 Thirty-three communities are above the exemption 
minima32 and twenty-three others are close to reaching the ten 
percent minimum.33 Of the communities that have not reached the ten 
percent minimum, over eighty percent of the affordable housing built 
in them exists because of Chapter 40B.34 Only forty-two out of 
Massachusetts’ 351 communities have no subsidized housing at all,35 
and most of these communities are small, rural towns where housing 
costs are already low.36 Over half of the affordable housing built is 
for families, approximately one-third is for the elderly, and one-tenth 
exists for special needs individuals.37 Two-thirds of the affordable 
housing built was approved outright by the ZBA, while the remaining 
one-third resulted from HAC appeals.38  
B. Rhode Island’s Low and Moderate Income Housing Act 
Rhode Island’s Low and Moderate Income Housing Act39 (the “RI 
Act”) is modeled after Chapter 40B.40 Enacted in 1991, the RI Act 
 
REPORT], available at http://www.chapa.org/TheRecordon40B.pdf. For an analysis of the 
evolution and increasing use of the use of Chapter 40B, see Krefetz, supra note 18, at 399–415. 
 31. CHAPA REPORT, supra note 30, at 9. The proportion of affordable housing units per 
Chapter 40B project decreased from earlier periods. See Krefetz, supra note 18, at 402. The 
majority of Chapter 40B housing now built is through the LIP process where private developers 
set aside only the minimum percentage required for affordable units. Id. at 410. While the 
quantity of affordable housing is sacrificed, quality may actually increase because smaller 
housing projects better blend with their surroundings, potentially lessening the stigma 
associated with affordable housing and its inhabitants. 
 32. See supra note 27. 
 33. CHAPA REPORT, supra note 30, at 20.  
 34. Id. at 8. For a description of the exemption minima, see supra note 27. 
 35. CHAPA REPORT, supra note 30, at 9. 
 36. Krefetz, supra note 18, at 393–94. This increase resulted in a more equitable 
distribution of affordable housing throughout Massachusetts. See CHAPA REPORT, supra note 
30, at 9. 
 37. CHAPA REPORT, supra note 30, at 9. 
 38. Id. Krefetz found that the number of decisions denying CP applications decreased 
from over forty percent to twenty percent from 1969 to 1999. Krefetz, supra note 18, at 400. 
She theorizes that although most of the HAC decisions favored developers, municipalities were 
still able to construct time-consuming and expensive “roadblocks” to construction, demanding 
that the two parties “work out compromises acceptable to both sides to enable projects to go 
forward.” Id. at 401. Of the appealed cases, eighty-four percent were in favor of the applicant. 
Id.; see also CHAPA REPORT, supra note 30, at 9. 
 39. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53 (Supp. 2004). 
 40. However, recent amendments to the RI Act have altered the appeals process 
considerably, causing the RI Act’s procedures to deviate from Chapter 40B’s procedures. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol18/iss1/12
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reflects Rhode Island’s recognition that “there exists an acute 
shortage of affordable, accessible, safe, and sanitary housing . . . 
[and] that it is necessary that each city and town provide 
opportunities for the establishment of low and moderate income 
housing . . . .”41 The RI Act seeks to create “housing opportunities for 
low and moderate income individuals” in every municipality, to 
rehabilitate existing housing, and to assimilate “low and moderate 
income housing into existing developments and neighborhoods.”42 
Like Chapter 40B, the RI Act consists of both a comprehensive 
permit component and an appeals component. The comprehensive 
permit component allows any affordable housing applicant43 whose 
project consists of at least twenty-five percent affordable housing to 
submit a single housing application to the local review board (LRB) 
“in lieu of separate applications” to multiple boards that are normally 
necessary.44 Upon submission, the application is reviewed for 
completeness.45 Once the application is certified as complete, the RI 
Act requires the LRB to notify other interested boards about the 
application, to hold a public hearing on the application, and to render 
a decision granting or denying the application within ninety-five days 
of the issuance of a certificate of completeness for minor projects and 
within 120 days of the issuance of a certificate of completeness for 
major projects.46 If the LRB grants the application, a CP is issued. If 
the LRB denies the application or grants it with conditions that make 
 41. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-2.  
 42. Id.  
 43. The RI Act does not define “applicant.” Previous versions of the RI Act permitted 
public agencies, nonprofit organizations, limited equity housing cooperatives, and private 
developers to apply for a CP. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4 (2002). Hence, it is likely that the RI 
Act generally imposes no restriction on the type of developer that can utilize the CP and appeals 
processes. However, there is currently a moratorium on applications from private developers, 
which will last until at least January 31, 2005. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4(b) (Supp. 2004).  
 44. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4(a). Similar to Chapter 40B, the RI Act requires the project 
to be eligible for a subsidy under a state or federal program that assists in the production of low 
or moderate income housing. R.I. CODE R. 96 090 3.02(i) (2003). Some argue that this 
requirement is misplaced. See Stonefield, supra note 17. 
 45. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-4(a)(2). For application requirements, see id. § 45-53-4(a)(1). 
Applications that are found incomplete may be resubmitted. Id. § 45-53-4(a)(2).  
 46. Id. § 45-53-4(a)(4). The time limit can be extended by mutual agreement between the 
LRB and applicant. Id. For the definition of a minor or major development, see id. §§ 45-23-
32(21)–(22), (24)–(25) (2002). 
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the project “infeasible,”47 the applicant may file an appeal with the 
State Housing Appeals Board (HAB).48 
The RI Act instructs the HAB to hold proceedings on the appeal 
within twenty days after it has been filed and to render a decision on 
the appeal within thirty days of the proceedings.49 During the 
proceedings, the HAB is limited to determining whether, from the 
LRB’s record, the LRB’s decision was “consistent with an approved 
affordable housing plan,50 or if the town does not have [such a plan]  
. . . consistent with local needs.”51 If the LRB’s actions are 
unreasonable and inconsistent with both local plans and local needs, 
the HAB may approve the application, deny the application,52 
approve the application with conditions, or modify or remove any 
infeasible conditions.53  
 47. “Infeasible” is defined as “any condition . . . that . . . makes it impossible for [the 
applicant] to proceed in building or operating low or moderate income housing without 
financial loss.” Id. § 45-53-3(3). This definition is very similar to Chapter 40B’s definition of 
“uneconomic.” See supra note 22. 
 48. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-5. The HAB is a seven-member board consisting of four 
local officials from different municipalities, “[one] affordable housing developer[,] [one] 
affordable housing advocate[,] [one] representative of the business community[,] and, [one] 
attorney knowledgeable in land use regulation.” Id. § 45-53-7(a)(1). 
 49. Id. § 45-53-5(c). The time limit can be extended by mutual agreement between the 
HAB and applicant. Id. 
 50. An “approved affordable housing plan” is defined as “an affordable housing plan that 
has been approved by the director of administration as meeting the guidelines for the local 
comprehensive plan,” as defined in the Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use 
Act, id. §§ 45-22.2-8 to -12 (2002). Id. § 45-53-3(7).  
 51. Id. § 45-53-6(b). The LRB’s decision is “consistent with local needs” when:  
Low or moderate housing exists which is: (A) in the case of an urban city or town 
which . . . [is composed of] rental units . . . [that] comprise twenty-five percent (25%) 
or more of the year-round housing units; is in excess of fifteen percent (15%) of the 
total occupied year-round rental units, or (B) in the case of all other cities and towns, 
in excess of ten percent (10%) of the year-round housing units . . . .  
Id. § 45-53-3(2)(i). The LRB’s decision is also “consistent with local needs” if a city or town 
“has promulgated zoning or land use ordinances . . . which ha[ve] been adopted and approved 
pursuant to [the Rhode Island Comprehensive Land Use and Planning Act], and the housing 
element of the comprehensive plan provides for low and moderate income housing [according 
to the numerical elements listed in § 45-53-3(2)(i) above].” Id. § 45-53-3(2)(ii). 
 52. Allowing the HAB to deny the application even when the LRB cannot support its 
decision is unique to the RI Act. Presumably, it will give the HAB more creativity in fashioning 
a remedy. 
 53. Id. § 45-53-6(d).  
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The precise effect of the RI Act on Rhode Island’s affordable 
housing supply is unknown. However, the affordable housing supply 
increased by nineteen percent in the ten years subsequent to the RI 
Act’s enactment.54 This figure constitutes approximately 5500 
affordable housing units.55 As of 2001, ten out of Rhode Island’s 
thirty-nine towns were exempt from the appeals procedure because 
they met one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions.56 Seven more 
towns were near reaching the ten percent minimum.57 During this 
period, the HAB heard twelve appeals: eight LRB decisions were 
overturned; one decision was upheld; and one decision was 
remanded.58  
Interestingly, since the RI Act’s passage, Rhode Island has 
experienced an increase in pro-affordability zoning in 
municipalities.59 This phenomenon presumably gives municipalities 
another avenue by which they can defend against the LRB’s 
actions.60 
C. Connecticut’s Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Procedure 
Connecticut’s Affordable Housing Land Use Appeals Procedure61 
(“Section 8-30g”) differs slightly from the Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island procedures. Enacted in 1989 in response to Connecticut’s 
concern over its affordable housing crisis,62 Section 8-30g was 
 
 54. STUART MECK ET AL., REGIONAL APPROACHES TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING 149 
(2002).  
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 149–50. Five towns met the ten percent exemption minimum while the other 
five towns met the rental unit minimums. Id. at 149. 
 57. See id. at 150–51. Of the seven, four have affordable housing stocks between six and 
eight percent, and three have affordable housing stocks between eight and ten percent. See id. 
 58. Id. at 149. Two additional decisions were found not to be properly before the HAB 
and two others were pending on appeal at the time the statistics were collected. Id. 
 59. Id. at 151. As of 1999, nearly half of Rhode Island’s municipalities had adopted some 
form of legislation to provide for affordable housing. Id. 
 60. See supra note 51. 
 61. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g (West Supp. 2004). For an exceptional breakdown 
of Section 8-30g, see Westbrook, supra note 6, at 174–96. 
 62. See Robert D. Carroll, Note, Connecticut Retrenches: A Proposal to Save the 
Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure, 110 YALE L.J. 1247, 1253 (2001). Carroll suggests that 
Section 8-30g was also motivated by the “fair share” principle enunciated in New Jersey’s 
Mount Laurel cases, S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 
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intended to encourage towns to participate in voluntary state 
inclusionary housing initiatives and to persuade local land use 
commissions to consider affordable housing needs.63  
Unlike the Massachusetts and Rhode Island procedures, Section 8-
30g does not contain a comprehensive permit component. Instead, it 
may be used by any person64 filing an affordable housing application 
with any housing commission.65 It requires that the person submit an 
affordability plan with the application.66 If the commission grants the 
application, a permit is issued to the developer. If the commission 
denies the application or grants it with conditions that have a 
“substantial adverse impact on the viability of the affordable housing 
development,” the applicant may modify and resubmit the 
application67 or appeal the commission’s decision to the presiding 
court in the district where the proposed development lies.68  
390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 
(N.J. 1975), and the belief that spatial deconcentration alleviates the “social ills” that result 
from concentrated poverty. Id. at 1253–54.  
 63. Westbrook, supra note 6, at 186–87. 
 64. “Person” is defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, 
governmental subdivision, agency, or public or private organization.” CONN. AGENCIES REGS. 
§ 8-30g-1-11 (2002). 
 65. “Affordable housing application” is defined as any application that proposes an 
affordable housing development. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g(a)(2). “Affordable housing 
development” is defined as a “proposed housing development which is (A) assisted housing, or 
(B) a set-aside development.” Id. § 8-30g(a)(1). “Assisted housing” is defined as “housing 
which is receiving . . . financial assistance under any governmental program for the construction 
. . . of low and moderate income housing.” Id. § 8-30g(a)(3). “Set-aside development” is 
defined as:  
[A] development in which not less than thirty per cent of the dwelling units will be 
conveyed by deeds containing covenants or restrictions which shall require that, for at 
least forty years after the initial occupation of the proposed development, such 
dwelling units shall be sold or rented at, or below, prices which will preserve the units 
as [affordable]. 
Id. § 8-30g(a)(6). 
 66. Id. § 8-30g(b)(1). The affordability plan must contain specific information about the 
housing development. Id. Types of information required by the affordability plan include: (1) 
the name of a person who will ensure that the affordability plan is carried out; (2) a marketing 
plan; (3) samples of the sales prices and rents; (4) a time line of the construction and marketing; 
and (5) drafts of regulations, conditions, deeds, covenants and other provisions. Id. The 
Commissioner of Economic and Community Development may also require that additional 
criteria be included in the plan. Id. § 8-30g(b)(2). 
 67. Id. § 8-30g(h). Resubmitting the application does not affect the person’s ability to 
appeal the commission’s decision. Id.  
 68. Id. Unlike Chapter 40B and the RI Act, a Section 8-30g applicant appeals to a court, 
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The court must hear the appeal “as soon . . . as is practicable.”69 
On appeal, the commission has the burden of proving from evidence 
in the record that either: its decision is necessary to protect 
substantial public interests70 that outweigh the need71 for affordable 
housing, which cannot be protected by reasonable changes to the 
project,72 and sufficient evidence supports its decision;73 or that the 
project results in the construction of affordable housing in an area 
that is zoned for industrial use and that such affordable housing is not 
assisted housing.74 However, a commission is exempt from the 
appeals procedure for the four years after its municipality receives a 
certificate of affordable housing project completion,75 which is 
awarded to municipalities that construct new affordable housing that 
constitutes more than two percent of the municipalities’ total 
dwelling units.76 A commission is also exempt from the appeals 
not to a housing appeals committee. The commission that drafted Section 8-30g “believed that 
creating a state-level appeals board with the power to override local zoning decision would be 
politically and administratively difficult . . . which would create the negative ‘symbolism of a 
state take-over of local government.’” MECK, supra note 54, at 154 (quoting Tondro, supra note 
17, at 1138–39). The judges that hear appeals are chosen by the Chief Court Administrator and 
appeals are considered “privileged cases” that are to be heard expediently. CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 8-30g(f).  
 69. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g(f). 
 70. See Carroll, supra note 62, at 1259–60, for examples of substantial public interests.  
 71. Unlike Chapter 40B and the RI Act, Section 8-30g does not define “need.” In 
Christian Activities Council, Congregational v. Town Council, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
stated that “the need for affordable housing is to be addressed on a local basis.” 735 A.2d 231, 
249 (Conn. 1999). Carroll argues that “[t]he effect of determining need locally is to reinforce 
the behavior of exclusionary municipalities. If a town has engaged in successful exclusionary 
strategies in the past, so that only affluent people are living in the town, then by definition the 
town has little or no need for affordable housing.” Carroll, supra note 62, at 1274.  
 72. Section 8-30g “is silent on what would constitute ‘reasonable changes,’ but the thrust 
of the provision is to encourage negotiation between commissions and developers.” Westbrook, 
supra note 6, at 193. Carroll agrees that the purpose of this requirement is to encourage 
negotiation. Carroll, supra note 62, at 1261. 
 73. See Westbrook, supra note 6, at 189–90, for a description of the meaning of 
“sufficient evidence.” Westbrook concludes that while the “sufficient evidence” standard was 
intended to be distinguishable from, and less rigorous than, a “substantial evidence” standard, 
“[i]n the context of [the] appeal procedure, the ‘sufficient evidence’ requirement may, in fact, 
be a very tough standard to meet.” Id. 
 74. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g(g). For a definition of “assisted housing,” see supra 
note 65. 
 75. Id. § 8-30g(l). 
 76. Id. § 8-30g(l)(4)(A). A municipality is also eligible for a certificate if affordable 
housing constitutes seventy-five housing unit equivalent points. Id. Instructions to compute 
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procedure if the property subject to the application lies in a 
municipality in which at least ten percent of the housing units are 
affordable.77 If the commission cannot satisfy any of these standards, 
the court must revise, remand, or reverse the commission’s 
decision.78 
Section 8-30g is responsible for the construction of some 
affordable housing in Connecticut. As a result of Section 8-30g, the 
state’s affordable housing stock increased by 10,000 units between 
1990 and 1998.79 In 2003, twenty-nine communities were above the 
exemption minima and twenty-six others were near reaching the ten 
percent minimum.80 Only one community had no affordable housing 
at all, although in thirteen others, less than one percent of the total 
housing stock was affordable.81 By 2000, seventy-four communities 
had enacted some form of pro-affordability zoning—eleven as a 
direct result of Section 8-30g.82 Of the total number of Section 8-30g 
units built, two-thirds were approved outright or resulted from 
negotiations between the developers and municipalities.83 The other 
one-third resulted from court decisions overturning the commission’s 
denial of a project.84 
 
housing unit equivalent points are found in the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies. 
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 8-30g-6. 
 77. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-30g(k). 
 78. Id. § 8-30g(g).  
 79. MECK, supra note 54, at 154.  
 80. Conn. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., Appeals List, 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.ct.gov/ecd/lib/ecd/2003_affordable_housing_appeals_list.xls. In nineteen of the 
municipalities, the affordable housing stock is between six and eight percent. Id. In the 
remaining seven, the affordable housing stock is between eight and ten percent. Id. These 
numbers are slightly down from 2002. See Conn. Dep’t of Econ. & Cmty. Dev., Appeals List, 1 
(2002), available at http://www.ct.gov/ecd/lib/ecd/appeals_list_2002.xls. 
 81. See id. However, many of these communities are smaller and more rural which is 
typically indicative of lower housing costs and demands. Id.; see also Krefetz, supra note 18, at 
393–94. 
 82. MECK, supra note 54, at 155. Another study found that forty-five towns enacted such 
regulations in response to Section 8-30g. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. By 1999, the courts had heard thirty-five appeals. In ten, the courts upheld the 
commissions’ denials; in twenty, the courts overruled the denials; and in five, the courts upheld 
the commissions’ approval against appeals by “affected” citizens. Id.  
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III. PRAISES AND CRITICISM OF THE APPEALS PROCEDURES  
A. The Criticism 
Criticism of the appeals procedures range from pragmatic 
concerns to constitutional challenges.85 The more common criticisms 
are discussed below.  
Both proponents and opponents of the appeals procedures have 
legitimate pragmatic concerns about the procedures (and affordable 
housing in general). They argue that “low-income households are 
likely to increase the demand for [a municipality’s] public services 
without contributing significantly to local tax revenues” that pay for 
such services.86 They also argue that affordable housing may lead to a 
decline in property values, which in turn would increase animosity 
towards affordable housing projects and their tenants.87 
Land use officials also have many criticisms of the appeals 
procedures. First, they dislike that the procedures eliminate the 
deference that is usually given to them in granting or denying 
housing applications.88 Traditionally, courts have been extremely 
 85. For an elaboration of various constitutional challenges to the appeals procedures, see 
Witten, supra note 19, at 541–46. Witten argues that the appeals procedures violate procedural 
and substantive due process and that they create an unconstitutional “giving.” Id. 
 86. Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (1995) [hereinafter State-Sponsored Growth Management]. 
However, this concern is rooted in affordable housing itself. It arises regardless of whether 
affordable housing is built using an appeals procedure.  
 87. See Forton, supra note 1. These concerns have never been held to be a legitimate 
reason for denying affordable housing. Carroll, supra note 62, at 1259. For an analysis finding 
that affordable housing has only negligible negative effects on housing values, see GEORGE C. 
GALSTER, A REVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH ON THE EFFECTS OF FEDERALLY ASSISTED 
HOUSING PROGRAMS ON NEIGHBORING RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES 4, 26 (2002), 
available at http://www.realtor.org/research.nsf/files/galsterreport.pdf/$FILE/galsterreport.pdf.  
 88. Peter J. Vodola, Note, Connecticut’s Affordable Housing Appeals Procedure Law in 
Practice, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1235, 1264–67 (1997); see also Carroll, supra note 62, at 1264–66. 
Carroll explains that planning officials find that “the procedure acts as a ‘zone busting’ device 
that gives developers unwarranted windfall profits and allows them to exercise too much 
leverage over local zoning boards.” Id. at 1264–65. However, planning officials have more 
control than they think. In Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and arguably Connecticut, a 
municipality that has a comprehensive plan that includes affordable housing may legitimately 
deny affordable housing. Supra notes 27, 50–51, 75–76 and accompanying text. Moreover, if 
the municipality “takes some initiative and manages the process well, it can shape a more 
creative housing proposal than otherwise might be built under ‘as-of-right’ zoning.” Werner 
Lohe, Command and Control to Local Control: The Environmental Agenda and the 
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deferential to local land use officials, allowing the officials to deny 
housing applications with little reason and with no evidence to 
support their decisions.89 The appeals procedures change this by 
requiring that the officials have both a valid reason for denying 
affordable housing applications and evidence on the record to support 
the denial.90 
Second, land use officials complain that the procedures allow 
developers to evade intelligent planning principles91 and 
environmental concerns.92 They assert that the procedures give 
developers “a gun . . . that they can use against the town whenever 
they want,” effectively “‘elevating’ affordable housing over proper 
land use planning.”93 While officials disagree over whether the 
construction of affordable housing is even a legitimate goal, all agree 
that municipalities need to retain more control over new housing 
developments.94  
Finally, land use officials complain that the appeals procedures 
are unfair. They protest that the ten percent exemption minimum is 
arbitrary, arguing that a municipality’s actual affordable housing 
need should be computed.95 They further complain that market rate 
 
Comprehensive Permit Law, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 355, 359 (2001). 
 89. Westbrook, supra note 6, at 176–78. Westbrook states that the Blue Ribbon 
Commission that recommended Section 8-30g “found that ‘many times the local commissions’ 
decisions elevate vaguely-stated and relatively unimportant concerns over the need to build 
affordable housing. At the same time, courts have not rigorously required commissions to give 
reasons for their decisions or to persuasively support them.” Id. at 173 (quoting BLUE RIBBON 
COMMISSION ON HOUSING A-7 (1989)). She explains that the appeals law changed this, 
resulting in courts taking a closer look at the commissions’ rationales for their decisions as well 
as the evidence supporting their decisions. Id. at 178–81. 
 90. See supra notes 24–29, 48–51, 70–74 and accompanying text.  
 91. See Witten, supra note 19, at 512; see also Vodola, supra note 88, at 1266–67. One 
Connecticut planner states that Section 8-30g “helps create ‘instant ghettos’ while proper 
planning could provide for affordable housing that is integrated well with the rest of the 
community.” Id. However, all the procedures have some form of exemption for municipalities 
that either begin building affordable housing on their own or that have a legitimate plan in place 
to build affordable housing. See supra notes 27, 50–51, 75–77 and accompanying text. This 
means that the municipality can control where affordable housing is built and what is built 
around it. 
 92. See Witten, supra note 19, at 531. 
 93. See Vodola, supra note 88, at 1265–66. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Witten, supra note 19, at 527 n.80. Witten argues that this aim “can hardly be 
considered a ‘goal’” because the ten percent threshold is chosen arbitrarily and does not tie 
affordable housing need with housing development. Id. Some critics argue that “[t]he strength 
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housing is unjustifiably excluded from the definition of affordable 
housing96 and that many other key terms in the procedures are 
“imprecise,” which leads to unpredictable and inequitable results.97 
Moreover, both proponents and opponents of the appeals procedures 
agree that the procedures do not give enough credit to municipalities 
that have made a good faith effort to build affordable housing.98 
Pundits recommend that the state and federal government provide 
more incentives to “do the right thing.”99 
Developers have their own complaints about the appeals 
procedures. Many find that the appeals process takes too long.100 
They argue that appeals litigation is expensive and that decisions in 
their favor are not enforced.101 They also complain that the process 
leads to ill will towards them, citing that judges are “unfriendly to 
 
of . . . [New Jersey’s] Fair Housing Act is that it assigns power to an administrative agency to 
evaluate housing needs and to formulate a consistent and rational fair-share distribution.” State-
Sponsored Growth Management, supra note 86, at 1136. For problems with using actual need 
to determine a municipality’s affordable housing requirements, see supra text accompanying 
note 71. Stonefield suggests that “as between the 10% standard and the more elaborate New 
Jersey approach, the clarity and simplicity of the 10% standard is preferable.” Stonefield, supra 
note 17, at 340. Tondro defends the ten percent threshold as a compromise; the exemption 
exists both because it is unfair to force a municipality with “that much affordable housing” to 
prove that it denied applications for proper reasons, and because it ensures that other 
municipalities that have not met the threshold “pull their weight.” Tondro, supra note 17, at 
121. 
 96. Vodola, supra note 88, at 1263; see Carroll, supra note 62, at 1265. But see Tondro, 
supra note 17 (explaining how this concern can be addressed).  
 97. Vodola, supra note 88, at 1263. 
 98. Id. at 1267; see also Witten, supra note 19, at 535. The exemption criteria in all three 
procedures give municipalities incentives to build affordable housing. See supra notes 27, 49–
51, 75–76 and accompanying text. While towns that are very near the ten percent exemption 
minimum but have not built affordable housing within a given year are the most likely to 
receive “unfair” treatment, towns that have made a decent attempt at constructing affordable 
housing within a given year are generally allowed an exemption from the appeals procedures in 
their state. Vodola, supra note 88, at 1267–68. 
 99. See Krefetz, supra note 18, at 415–16; Stonefield, supra note 17, at 353–54; State-
Sponsored Growth Management, supra note 86, at 1136–37. “State and federal actions and 
funding programs need to be expanded, including more direct subsidies for the construction of 
low-income housing and offsetting funds for services, which could come in the form of 
additional local aid to towns that encourage, or at least approve, proposals for such housing.” 
Krefetz, supra note 18, at 416. 
 100. Vodola, supra note 88, at 1283–86. 
 101. See Krefetz, supra note 18, at 404. “[L]ocal communities ha[ve] demonstrated that 
they [can] ‘lose the battle but win the war’ by dragging out the proceedings through lengthy 
court appeals, which often result[s] in developers either not being able to sustain the carrying 
costs over time or losing their land options or financing.” Id. 
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affordable housing” developments, that town officials harbor 
animosity towards such developments and their developers, and that 
municipalities’ inhabitants are angry about the effects of affordable 
housing on their infrastructure and property values.102 
Proponents of the appeals procedures suggest that the procedures 
simply need to be improved. They call for more empirical studies 
concerning the effects of the procedures,103 asserting that studies will 
not only enable the legislatures to assess the procedures’ impacts,104 
but also add legitimacy to the procedures by educating people about 
the procedures’ existence, effects, and results. Other individuals, 
acknowledging that racial integration is another—albeit 
unenumerated—goal of the procedures, argue that the procedures 
need to address the goal head on, rather than masking it behind issues 
of classism.105 
Finally, some scholars complain that the procedures address the 
wrong problem.106 These scholars argue that the appeals procedures 
create only a private right to construct affordable housing while 
ignoring the moral responsibility of both the state and its towns to 
provide affordable housing.107 They contend that practical, 
enforceable legal obligations must be imposed on both the state and 
its towns to ensure that these entities meet their responsibilities, 
promoting the “communitarian moral principle” that every person is 
responsible for the well-being of every other person.108 
 
 102. Vodola, supra note 88, at 1284. 
 103. Krefetz, supra note 18, at 417–18; see also Florence Wagman Roisman, Opening the 
Suburbs to Racial Integration: Lessons for the 21st Century, 23 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 65, 
101–02 (2001); Stonefield, supra note 17, at 350–51. These studies require manpower and 
financing for which states may not have the wherewithal.  
 104. Krefetz, supra note 18, at 417–19. 
 105. Roisman, supra note 103, at 105–06. If this is not done, it is likely that suburban 
homes will go to “deserving” families already residing in the municipality rather than 
predominantly minority families residing in more urban areas. Id. Stonefield also adopts this 
idea, finding that such mobility “can open the doors to . . . an urban family otherwise priced out 
of that American dream . . . provide modest steps towards racial integration and the reduction of 
racial isolation . . . [and] strengthen cities by reducing the hypersegregation and concentration 
of very poor individuals . . . in urban areas.” Stonefield, supra note 17, at 346–47. 
 106. See generally Stonefield, supra note 17, at 341–49 (discussing the pros and cons to 
creating a private right instead of a public obligation). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 354. Stonefield argues that by requiring each town to acknowledge a need for 
affordable housing and to decide how best to meet its needs, “the communitarian moral 
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B. The Praises 
Despite the many criticisms of the appeals procedures, it is 
impossible to ignore that they have achieved some success. All of the 
procedures have promoted the development of affordable housing 
within their states.109 Many affordable housing developers claim that 
their projects never would have been approved without the 
procedures110 and that the procedures force municipalities to be more 
aware of, and to take greater responsibility for, the creation of 
affordable housing.111 Moreover, municipalities are now more willing 
to negotiate with affordable housing developers, leading to an 
“everybody wins” or at least an “everybody is content” situation.112 
There is no doubt that negotiation leads to projects that blend better 
with their surroundings, which preserves local autonomy and 
removes the stigma attached to the projects’ residents.  
IV. ILLINOIS’ AFFORDABLE HOUSING PLANNING AND APPEAL ACT 
A. Description  
Illinois’ Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act113 went 
into effect January 1, 2004. The Act responds to Illinois’ findings that 
there exists a shortage of affordable housing in the state and that 
action is necessary to assure that such housing exists for the 
workforce and retirees.114 It seeks to encourage municipalities to 
construct affordable housing sufficient to meet their needs and to 
provide “affordable housing developers, who believe that they have 
 
principle that most strongly supports the suburban affordable housing movement and best 
accommodates . . . the competing interest in local autonomy” is supported, while also 
“converting the override tool from the private . . . builder[’s remedy] into the public obligation 
owed by state and local government[s].” Id.  
 109. See supra notes 30–38, 54–60, 79–84 and accompanying text. 
 110. Vodola, supra note 88, at 1264.  
 111. See Westbrook, supra note 6, at 196. This phenomenon is evident in the creation of 
comprehensive plans and pro-affordability legislation within municipalities. See supra notes 59 
and 82 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Krefetz, supra note 18, at 401–03. 
 113. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/1–50 (Supp. 2003). 
 114. Id. at 67/5. 
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been unfairly treated” because their development contains affordable 
housing, with a remedy.115 
Unlike the Massachusetts and Rhode Island appeals procedures, 
the Illinois Act does not contain a comprehensive permit 
component.116 Instead, it consists of a planning component and an 
appeals component. The planning component requires the Illinois 
Housing Development Authority to determine which municipalities 
are exempt from the Illinois Act.117 It further requires all non-exempt 
municipalities to approve an affordable housing plan by April 1, 
2005.118 
The appeals component applies to any “affordable housing 
developer,”119 seeking approval to build an “affordable housing 
development.”120 If an approving authority121 denies the affordable 
housing developer’s application or approves the application with 
conditions that, in the developer’s judgment, make constructing 
affordable housing infeasible,122 the developer may, between the 
 115. Id. at 67/10. 
 116. Both the Massachusetts and Rhode Island appeal procedures contain planning 
components as well. Each procedure grants an exemption to a municipality that has adopted an 
“affordable housing plan” and is making steps towards achieving that plan. MASS. REGS. CODE 
tit. 760, § 31.07(i) (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-53-3(2)(ii) (1999). 
 117. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/20(a). 
 118. Id. at 67/25(a). The Illinois Act sets out specific requirements that the affordable 
housing plan must contain. Id. at 67/25(b). 
 119. “Affordable housing developer” is defined as “a nonprofit entity, limited equity 
cooperative or public agency, or private individual, firm, corporation, or other entity seeking to 
build an affordable housing development.” Id. at 67/15. 
 120. An “[a]ffordable housing development” is defined as housing that is  
subsidized by the federal or [s]tate government or . . . in which at least 20% of the 
dwelling units are subject to . . . restrictions that require that the . . . units be sold or 
rented at prices that preserve them as affordable . . . for a period of at least 15 years, in 
the case of for-sale housing, and at least 30 years, in the case of rental housing. 
Id. “Development” is defined as: 
any building, construction, renovation, or excavation or any material change in the use 
or appearance of any structure or in the land itself; the division of land into parcels; or 
any change in the intensity or use of land, such as an increase in the number of 
dwelling units in a structure or a change to a commercial use. 
Id. 
 121. “Approving authority” is defined as “the governing body of the county or 
municipality.” Id. 
 122. In the Act, the developer’s judgment appears to be a completely subjective standard. 
Moreover, the term “infeasible” is not defined. This combination may permit developers to 
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years 2006 and 2009, submit information to the state Housing 
Appeals Board (HAB)123 regarding the authority’s action. Beginning 
in 2009, the developer may appeal the approving authority’s decision 
to the HAB.124  
The Act mandates that the HAB render a decision on the appeal 
within 120 days of its receipt.125 The Act also instructs the HAB to 
conduct a de novo review to determine “whether the developer was 
treated in a manner that places an undue burden126 on the 
development due to the fact that the development contains affordable 
housing.”127 Significantly, the developer bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the project was unfairly denied or that 
unreasonable conditions were placed on it.128 If the HAB finds that 
the developer’s application was unfairly denied or granted with 
infeasible conditions, the HAB may reverse or modify the authority’s 
decision.129 However, if at least ten percent of the municipality’s 
housing stock is affordable,130 if the developer’s application is denied 
abuse the appeals process, which could lead to animosity towards the Act. 
 123. The HAB consists of seven voting members and one non-voting member. 310 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 67/50. The voting members are appointed by the Governor and are comprised of a 
retired circuit or appellate judge, a zoning board of appeals member, a planning board member, 
a mayor or municipal council member, a county board member, an affordable housing 
developer, and an affordable housing advocate. Id. The non-voting member is the Chairman of 
the Illinois Housing Development Authority. Id.  
 124. Id. at 67/30. 
 125. Id. 
 126. The Illinois Act does not define “undue burden.” 
 127. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/30(c). 
 128. Id. All other appeals procedures shift the burden of proof to the municipality. Supra 
notes 28, 51, 74 and accompanying text.  
 129. 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 67/30.  
 130. “Affordable housing” is defined as “housing that has a sales price or rental amount 
that is within the means of a household that may occupy moderate-income or low-income 
housing,” meaning that no more than 30% of a household’s gross annual income can be used 
towards housing or rental expenses. Id. at 67/15. “Moderate-income housing” is defined as 
“housing that is affordable according to the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, for either home ownership or rental, and that is occupied, reserved, or marketed 
for occupancy by households with a gross income that is greater than 50% but does not exceed 
80% of the area median gross household income.” Id. “Low-income housing” is defined as 
“housing that is affordable, according to the federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, for either home ownership or rental, and that is occupied, reserved, or marketed 
for occupancy by households with a gross household income that does not exceed 50% of the 
area median gross household income.” Id. “Area median household income” is defined as “the 
median household income adjusted for family size for applicable income limit areas as 
determined annually by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development under 
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or approved with infeasible conditions because it does not conform 
with requirements that protect the general welfare,131 or if the 
municipality has implemented and met the stated goals of an 
affordable housing plan, the HAB must dismiss the appeal.132 
B. Predictions  
The Illinois Act will endure many of the same criticisms as the 
other appeals procedures and will incite new criticisms of its own.133 
It raises the same pragmatic concerns as the other appeals 
procedures.134 The construction of low and moderate income housing, 
or any housing for that matter, increases the demand for a 
municipality’s public services. As a matter of progressive tax rates, 
people residing in low and moderate income housing likely 
contribute less to the revenues used to fund such services than people 
in higher income brackets. Moreover, despite conflicting research on 
the effect of affordable housing on surrounding property values,135 
people continue to believe that the value of their property is 
negatively impacted by affordable housing. This belief will not 
change until societal stereotypes about low or moderate income 
housing change. However, state and federal incentives that reward 
municipalities for building affordable housing can alleviate some of 
the infrastructure and public service funding problems136—this alone 
may lead to less stereotypical, negative feelings towards affordable 
housing and its tenants. The Illinois Act does not provide such 
incentives.137  
Section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937.” Id. (citation omitted). The procedure for 
determining the ratio of affordable housing stock to total housing stock is set out in 310 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 67/20. 
 131. Id. at 67/30. The Illinois Act refers to such regulations as “non-appealable local 
government requirements” and defines them as “all essential requirements that protect the 
public health and safety, including any local building, electrical, fire, or plumbing code 
requirements or those requirements that are critical to the protection or preservation of the 
environment.” Id. at 67/15. 
 132. Id. at 67/30. 
 133. See supra notes 85–108 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 135. See GALSTER, supra note 87.  
 136. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 137. Illinois provides financial incentives to developers to build affordable housing. See, 
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Moreover, while the Act contains many provisions that permit 
municipalities to exempt themselves from the appeals procedure, 
municipalities will still view the Act as undermining local 
autonomy.138 Unlike the other procedures, the Act shifts the burden of 
proof back to the developer to show that the housing application was 
unfairly denied.139 The Act also permits a municipality to completely 
exempt itself from the appeals process simply by implementing an 
affordable housing plan.140 Finally, it permits municipalities to enact 
“non-appealable local government requirements” with which all 
affordable housing developments must comply.141 Hence, if local 
land officials “take control,” the only autonomy lost will be caused 
by the officials’ own error. However, officials in Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut also have many options for exempting 
their municipalities from the appeals process,142 and they still view 
the appeals procedures as removing local control.143 Accordingly, it is 
likely that Illinois officials will also be “blind” to their own 
control.144 
The Act will also be viewed as unfair for the same reasons critics 
allege that the other appeals procedures are unfair.145 Similar to the 
e.g., 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/1 to /17 (2002) (providing money for the construction and 
rehabilitation of affordable housing). However, these incentives focus on the wrong entity. 
While incentives must be given to developers to encourage them to build affordable housing, 
they also must be given to municipalities where affordable housing is built. It is only then that 
municipalities can counteract the infrastructure concerns espoused by affordable housing 
opponents. See supra note 99. 
 138. Supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra note 128. The shift of the burden of proof to municipalities is the most 
criticized feature of the procedures. However, shifting the burden of proof back to the developer 
seems contrary to the very purpose and structure of an affordable housing appeals procedure. 
See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 132. All non-exempt municipalities are required to develop a plan. 
Supra note 118. 
 141. Supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 142. Supra notes 27–28, 50–51, 70, 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 143. Supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.  
 144. The same can be said for arguments that the appeals procedures allow developers to 
circumvent good planning principles and environmental concerns. See supra notes 91–94 and 
accompanying text. Unlike the other appeals processes which allow an appeals board to 
circumvent local zoning and environmental ordinances, the Illinois Act recognizes such 
concerns as legitimate reasons to deny an affordable housing application. See supra notes 27, 
50–51, 75–76 and accompanying text for a description of the manners by which municipalities 
may avoid the appeals procedures. 
 145. Supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p267 Devitt book pages.doc  10/18/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
288 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 18:267 
 
 
 
other appeals procedures, the Illinois Act does not use a 
municipality’s actual affordable housing need to determine 
exemptions; instead, it “arbitrarily” exempts municipalities whose 
total housing stock is at least ten percent affordable.146 Also, similar 
to the other appeals procedures, the Act excludes market rate housing 
from the definition of affordable housing,147 and it does not define 
many key terms, such as “infeasible” and “undue burden.”148 
Moreover, like Rhode Island, it gives little credit to municipalities 
making good faith efforts to build affordable housing, exempting 
municipalities only if they achieve the ten percent minimum or have 
adopted and implemented an affordable housing plan.149  
Additionally, the Act actually exacerbates problems with litigation 
costs.150 The Act’s appeals process is inherently longer than any of 
the other states’ processes because each appeal is a de novo review, 
rather than a review of the record.151 Moreover, the HAB must render 
its decision within 120 days of the appeal’s filing, which is nearly 
two-and-one-half times as long as any of the other procedures.152 
Nor will the Illinois Act alleviate ill will towards affordable 
housing developers. Ill will arises from stereotypical views of 
 146. Supra note 132. However, this arbitrary minimum may be a “blessing in disguise.” 
See text accompanying supra note 95. 
 147. Supra note 96. 
 148. Supra notes 97, 122, 126 and accompanying text. Approving authorities will probably 
also take issue with the provision permitting affordable housing developers to determine 
whether conditions imposed by the authority make the project “infeasible,” arguing that the lack 
of definition of “infeasible” allows developers to inappropriately appeal authority decisions. 
Supra note 122.  
 149. See supra notes 27–28, 50–51, 70–77, 130–32 and accompanying text. The deadlines 
for creating an affordable housing plan were also likely to be viewed as unfair. The Act 
required that all non-exempt municipalities create an affordable housing plan by April 1, 2005. 
Supra note 118. However, the determination of exempt and non-exempt municipalities began in 
October 2004. Supra note 117. This left non-exempt municipalities only six months to create an 
acceptable affordable housing plan. 
 150. Supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 151. Supra notes 25, 51, 74. The overall effect of a de novo review is difficult to determine. 
On the one hand, it does not give the approving authority any incentive to create a complete 
record of its decision. On the other hand, if an approving authority’s record is incomplete, it still 
permits the HAB to look at the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an 
application was denied “due to the fact” that it contained affordable housing. Id.; 310 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 67/30. 
 152. See supra notes 24, 49, 69 and accompanying text. This delay can lead to loss of 
financing for the affordable housing project. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
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affordable housing tenants as well as the negative effects of 
affordable housing on a municipality. Because the primary goal of 
the Act is to construct affordable housing, the Act will breed 
contempt rather than mitigate it.153  
Finally, the Act may actually make it more difficult to construct 
affordable housing. It shifts the burden of proof back to the developer 
to show that an application’s denial was “due to the fact” that the 
development contained affordable housing.154 This burden shift is an 
impediment for affordable housing development because of courts’ 
traditional deference to the decisions of local land use officials.155 
Moreover, the HAB may define the phrase “due to the fact” narrowly 
to require that affordable housing be the dispositive factor for the 
denial of an affordable housing application.156 This, coupled with the 
burden shift to the developer, establishes a potentially 
insurmountable threshold for a developer, and places municipalities 
in a similar position to the one they occupied prior to the Act.157  
 
 153. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; supra notes 86–87 and accompanying 
text. Ill will arising from the loss of local control may be alleviated, but as long as affordable 
housing opponents have viable arguments, or at least harbor prejudices against affordable 
housing, ill will towards affordable housing developers will exist. Id. 
 154. Supra note 127.  
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 90. While the HAB is expected to conduct an 
independent review, the past deference given to municipalities and the mere onus placed on the 
developer to overcome the initial burden make it likely that the HAB will not be nearly as 
liberal in its decisions as other states appealing authorities. See supra notes 38, 58, 84.  
 156. There is no evidence which indicates how the HAB will interpret the phrase “due to 
the fact.” In fact, there is little Illinois case law that interprets the phrase. However, in order to 
implement the purposes of the Act, the HAB should interpret the phrase broadly.  
 157. See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. Moreover, until 2009, the Act only 
permits developers to report to the HAB that their application was denied “due to the fact” that 
it contained affordable housing. Supra note 124. It offers no incentives for developers to do this 
and it is unlikely that a developer will still desire to build its development in 2009 when it can 
actually appeal the authority’s decision. See Krefetz, supra note 18 (discussing the additional 
expenses that delay may cause). Burned once, it is doubtful that developers will want to be 
reminded of their denial as they go through the procedural hassle of reporting the authority to 
the HAB, while receiving nothing in return. Finally, since the appeals portion of the Act does 
not go into effect until 2009, it is quite possible that it could be repealed before then. 310 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 67/30. Currently, it merely threatens municipalities to get an affordable housing 
plan in place with the promise that if they fail, a few years from now they could be punished. 
Id. However, if the threat of the appeals procedures results in the creation of affordable housing 
plans and, as a result, affordable housing, then the Act has done its job, perhaps with much less 
controversy than any of the other appeals procedures. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Illinois Act’s deviations from the Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island, and Connecticut appeals procedures will do little to temper 
the criticisms of its own appeals process. Despite the Act’s strides to 
accommodate local land use officials, the officials will still view the 
appeals process as a usurpation of their authority. Moreover, the Act 
does nothing to alter stereotypical views of affordable housing and its 
tenants, and, unless the HAB interprets the Act’s language broadly, 
the Act will promote affordable housing development no better than 
the legislative scheme Illinois previously had in effect.  
However, despite the criticisms that the Illinois Act will foster, its 
enactment reveals Illinois’ recognition that the provision of 
affordable housing is every municipality’s obligation. This 
recognition alone moves Illinois one step closer to the 
“communitarian moral principle”158 that the well-being of others is a 
public obligation.  
 
 158. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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